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Notes 
J urisdici:ion-Indirec:tly Affec:l:ing Land in Ano:ther S:ta:l:e 
by Judgmen:I: in Personam 
A husband and wife were residents of Wyoming. In a divorce 
proceeding in that state, having both parties before it and hav-
ing jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, the Wyoming 
court granted a decree of divorce to the wife. The decree ordered 
the husband to deliver to the wife a quit claim deed to property 
in Nebraska. The husband did not comply with this order. In-
stead, he left Wyoming and went to the situs of the land in Ne-
braska and brought a suit there to have the Wyoming decree de-
clared void and to quiet his interest in the property. The wife 
cross-petitioned asking that the Wyoming decree be enforced, or 
in the alternative, to quiet title in the wife to the husband's in-
terest in the property. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial 
court with orders to render a judgment either enforcing the order 
of the Wyoming Court, or in the alternative, quieting title in the 
wife to the husband's interest in the property.1 The problem pre-
sented in this case is the effect, in Nebraska, of a decree of a 
sister state ordering a conveyance of Nebraska real estate.2 
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Consti-
tution states: 
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.a 
This clause does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one 
state to property situated in another, but only makes the judg-
ment rendered conclusive on the merits of the claim or subject 
1 Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959). 
2 See Barbour, Extraterritorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17 MICH. 
L. REV. 527 at 532 (1919), where it is submitted: 
If the defendant is personally before a court of equity, the 
court has power to order him to convey foreign land. Such a 
decree is an effective judgment and determines conclusively his 
obligation to convey, and this obligation remains binding upon 
the person of the defendant wherever found. Such a decree 
ought to be entitled to full faith and credit at the situs of the 
land. 
a U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1. 
NOTES 421 
matter of the suit.4 Thus, it is said that a court of one state can-
not directly affect or determine the title to real property located 
in another state.5 
But it is also well settled that a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in one state with all necessary parties properly before it in 
an action for divorce, generally has the power to render a decree 
ordering the execution and delivery of a deed to property in an-
other state in lieu of alimony for the wife. Such an order is 
personam in character, and when final it is generally res judicata. 
Such an order will be given full faith and credit under the Con-
stitution of the United States.6 Therefore, the real property may 
be affected indirectly through the instrumentality of the court's 
authority over the person.7 
With a decree for money there does not seem to be much 
trouble in obtaining full faith and credit,8 but there is a diffi-
culty at times when the decree orders the doing of an act. In 
Bullock v. Bullock,9 a New Jersey case, an order by a New York 
court in a divorce proceeding ordering the husband to execute 
to his wife a mortgage on New Jersey land was not enforced. The 
New Jersey court refused to enforce the order upon the ground 
that jurisdiction over land in New Jersey would not be conceded 
to courts of other states. The opinion also added that at the most, 
the order of the New York court created only a duty from the 
husband to the New York court. 
The plaintiff husband in the instant case relied upon a Ne-
braska case, Fall v. Fall,10 later affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Fall v. Eastin,11 as stating the law of Nebraska 
4 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909). 
5 Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N.J.Eq. 561, 30 A. 676 (1894); Van Cortlandt 
v. DeGraffenried, 147 App. Div. 825, 132 N.Y. Supp. 1107 (1st Dep't 
1911) aff d, 204 N.Y. 667, 98 N.E. 1118 (1912); Tiedemann v. Tiede-
mann, 172 App. Div. 819, 158 N.Y. Supp. 851 (1st Dep't 1916) aff d, 
225 N.Y. 709, 122 N.E. 892 (1919). 
6 Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N.W. 127 (1919); Mallette v. 
Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 160 N.W. 182 (1916); See cases cited in 21 
U. CHI. L. REV. 620 (1954). 
7 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); See cases cited 19 AM. JUR. Equity 
§ 25 (1938). 
s Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 218 (3d ed. 1949). 
9 52 N.J.Eq. 561, 30 A. 676 (1894). 
10 75 Neb. 104, 106 N.W. 412 (1905), rev'd on rehearing in 75 Neb. 120, 
113 N.W. 175 (1907). 
11 215 U.S. 1 (1909). 
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that a sister state decree could not directly affect title to real 
estate in Nebraska. 
In the Fall case, a divorce decree was granted in Washington, 
the court there having jurisdiction over the parties. The hus-
band was ordered to convey to his wife, lands in Nebraska. But 
instead, the husband executed a mortgage deed to a third party. 
The former wife brought an action in Nebraska to quiet title to 
the land and to cancel the mortgage deed, setting up the Wash-
ington decree as a basis for her claim. The mortgagee and the 
grantee appeared but the husband, served by publication only, 
did not. The Nebraska Supreme Court denied the relief sought 
by the former wife, and the decision was affirmed on appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court. It should be noted that the 
court avoided saying that the decree would not be binding be-
tween the original parties, had the husband been before the court. 
In the instant case, the Fall decision was distinguished12 in that 
1) Nebraska, at the time of the Fall case, did not have statutory 
authority to award real estate of a husband as alimony in a di-
vorce case. Thus, Nebraska was not compelled under the full 
faith and credit clause to recognize a sister state order which 
the courts of Nebraska could not themselves lawfully render. That 
void was filled in 1907. The Nebraska legislature, by enacting 
what is now Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-321 (Reissue 1952), gave 
Nebraska courts the power to award real estate as alimony. 2) The 
husband in the Fall case was not personally served and made no 
appearance in the suit, while here, the husband was before the 
court seeking to quiet title to his interest in the real estate.13 
The plaintiff, in the Fall case, was in effect asking that the 
sister state decree be given in rem effect as against a third per-
son and not merely that it be treated as res judicata on the merits.14 
12 It is interesting to note that authorities cite the Bullock decision, 
supra note 9 and the Fall decision, supra note 11 as being in accord. 
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 8 at 641 and STUMBERG, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS c. 5 at 127 (2d ed. 1951). Thus as the Weesner case answers 
a like question, but :reaches an opposite result, the latter would seem to 
overrule the Fall case. The court, however, stood its ground and 
distinguished the cases. 
13 Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 356, 95 N.W.2d 682, 689 (1959). 
14 STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 12 at 128; But see Amey v. Colebrook 
Guaranty Savings Bank, 92 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 1937) where the 
court said of the Fall opinion: 
The court might have held that the husband's grantee, who 
took with notice, was under the same personal obligation as he; 
and that, although the Washington decree had adjudicated noth-
ing as to the interests in the land, his -obligation to convey was 
res judicata. 
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The maxim that a court of one state cannot directly affect 
or determine title to real property located in another state is not 
as final as it sounds. Under the guise of "indirectly affecting" 
real property, courts of one state may affect real property in an-
other by rendering an in personam order fo convey title t-o that 
land. Once this order becomes final, it is then backed by the 
full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 
Parker L. Shipley '61 
